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Abigail Luhn 
HOW TO AVOID ADDING INSULT TO INJURY UNDER THE MARITIME RESCUE DOCTRINE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A circuit split exists between the Second and Fourth Circuits regarding the correct 
standard of care to be applied under the maritime rescue doctrine.1  This is an important issue 
because the rescue doctrine functions as a response to the defense of contributory negligence and 
the standards used under the doctrine thereby affect the rescuer’s ability to recover damages for 
their injuries.2  The federal judiciary has supplied much of admiralty’s substantive law.  
Although portions of the admiralty common law have been provided by the Supreme Court, a 
consensus of lower federal court decisions constitutes nearly all of the prevailing law in this 
area.3 Given the importance of the lower federal courts in admiralty law, the existence of a 
circuit split involving admiralty torts is both intriguing and troubling – intriguing because of the 
aforementioned, crucial role these courts play, and troubling because the circuits on either side of 
the split fail to consider the best possible solution born out of compromise. 
In Barlow v. Liberty Mar. Corp., the Second Circuit chose to apply a reasonableness 
standard in maritime injury cases, essentially retiring the rescue doctrine in the admiralty 
context.4  In Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. (Furka I), the Fourth Circuit decided to 
apply a reckless and wanton standard to the rescuer’s conduct5; and in Furka v. Great Lakes 
                                                          
1 Barlow v. Liberty Mar. Corp., 746 F.3d 518, 526 (2d Cir. 2014); Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. (Furka 
I), 755 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir. 1985); Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. (Furka II), 824 F.2d 330, 331 
(4th Cir. 1987). 
2 Barlow, 746 F.3d at 524. 
3 W. Eugene Davis, The Role of Federal Courts in Admiralty: The Challenges Facing the Admiralty Judges of the 
Lower District Courts, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1355, 1357-58 (2001). 
4 Barlow, 746 F.3d at 529. 
5 Furka I, 755 F.2d at 1088. 
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Dredge & Dock Co. (Furka II), the Fourth Circuit chose to apply a reckless and wanton standard 
to the rescuer’s perception of the emergency situation.6 
 This article, argues that the rescue doctrine should be modified to use a bifurcated 
standard: a reasonableness standard for the perception aspect of the rescue doctrine and a 
reckless and wanton standard for the conduct aspect of the rescue doctrine.  Therefore, this 
article disagrees with both sides of the circuit split, discussed in detail below, and instead 
suggests that a hybrid solution is the best reform option.   
 Part II of this article explains the necessary background with regards to the principle 
cases and major concepts involved.  Part III provides critical analysis, including justifications for 
borrowing from terrestrial torts to solve an admiralty tort issue.  This portion of the article 
contains arguments in favor of a reckless conduct standard, as proposed in Furka I, as well as, 
arguments in favor of a reasonable perception standard, which was inherently accepted by the 
court in Barlow.  Part III also provides a discussion of how Good Samaritan statutes adopted 
throughout the country appear to mirror the article’s proposed bifurcated standard.  Part IV 
concludes the article. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OR FAULT 
The accepted definition of contributory negligence is “[c]onduct on the part of the 
plaintiff which falls below the standard of conduct to which he should conform for his own 
protection, and which is a legally contributing cause cooperating with the negligence of the 
defendant in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm.”7  In general, the old rule was that “the 
plaintiff’s contributory negligence bars recovery against a defendant whose negligent conduct 
                                                          
6 Furka II, 824 F.2d at 332. 
7 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 463 (Am. Law Inst. 1965). 
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would otherwise make him liable to the plaintiff for the harm sustained by [the plaintiff].”8  Yet, 
comparative negligence has now generally replaced the use of contributory negligence as a total 
bar to recovery.9 
B. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE OR FAULT 
Generally under a comparative negligence regime, when a plaintiff negligently causes 
their own injury, “the plaintiff’s recovery [reduces] in proportion to the share of responsibility 
the factfinder assigns to the plaintiff.”10  Therefore, comparative negligence only functions as a 
partial bar to a negligent plaintiff’s recovery for their own injury, rather than as a complete 
limitation. 
C. THE COMMON LAW RESCUE DOCTRINE 
The maritime rescue doctrine functions as a response to a defendant’s assertion of 
contributory fault as a defense.11  Under the doctrine, would-be rescuers can only be held 
contributorily accountable for injuries incurred during a rescue attempt resulting from their own 
reckless and wanton behavior.12  Therefore, under the rescue doctrine, a defendant alleging 
contributory fault is required to show that the plaintiff rescuer acted not only negligently, but 
recklessly, thereby providing the plaintiff rescuer with additional leeway with regards to their 
recovery.13   
Through application of the doctrine, a rescuer, who suffers injury while attempting to 
save an endangered party, may recover from a third party whose negligent behavior created the 
peril.14  Additionally, if the endangered party negligently caused the peril, the rescuer can 
                                                          
8 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 467 (Am. Law Inst. 1965). 
9 Restatement (Third) of Torts § 7 (Am. Law Inst. 2000). 
10 Id. 
11 Barlow v. Liberty Mar. Corp., 746 F.3d 518, 524 (2d Cir. 2014). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Fulton v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 675 F.2d 1130, 1133-34 (10th Cir. 1982). 
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potentially recover from the endangered party.15  The rescue doctrine “is based upon the 
principle that it is commendable to save life, and, although the person attempting a rescue 
voluntarily exposes himself to danger, the law will not impute to him responsibility for being 
injured while attempting such rescue.”16  Consequently, this policy also referred to as the 
“humanitarian doctrine,” “negate[s] the defense of assumption of risk.”17 
Prior to the rescue doctrine’s application in maritime rescue cases, the doctrine was 
traditionally used in terrestrial rescue cases; in fact, the rescue doctrine first appeared in Wagner 
v. International R. Co., a terrestrial tort case involving a rescue attempt on land.18  This is one 
reason courts ought to feel comfortable using terrestrial tort cases to inform their choice of which 
standards to apply under the maritime rescue doctrine.   
D. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: CASES ON EITHER SIDE 
1. CREATION OF THE SPLIT: THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S BARLOW V. LIBERTY MAR. CORP. 
George Barlow, the Plaintiff-Appellant in this case, had approximately thirty-three years 
of experience working at sea prior to this injury on the ship, the Liberty Sun.19  He had worked 
as a deck hand, passed his merchant marine officer’s exam, licensing him “to serve as an officer 
aboard U.S. flagged cargo vessels,” later received his master’s license, the equivalent to a 
captain’s qualification, and spent his entire career at sea aboard assorted vessels.20  Yet, at the 
time of the accident, Barlow had no experience actually commanding a ship.21  In 2007, Barlow 
                                                          
15 Id. at 1134. 
16 Wolff v. Light, 169 N.W.2d 93, 98 (N.D. 1969).   
17 Commonwealth v. Millsaps, 352 S.E.2d 311, 311-12 (Va. 1987). 
18 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921). 
19 Barlow v. Liberty Mar. Corp., 746 F.3d 518, 520 (2d Cir. 2014). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
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took what would ultimately be his last job on a vessel, a position as third mate on the Motor 
Vessel Liberty Sun, a cargo ship.22 
The incident instigating this law suit occurred two months after Barlow began 
employment on the Liberty Sun.23  At the time of the incident, the Liberty Sun was tied-up 
alongside a floating grain elevator and moored alongside a loading terminal in a Brazilian port 
on the Amazon River.24  To partially control the ship’s movement, the Liberty Sun had in total 
six lines securing it to mooring buoys: three lines forward, two lines aft, and one line off the port 
quarter.25  The ship also had two starboard breast lines, lines running perpendicular to the ship in 
order to control its distance from the pier, which were connected to lines from the shore.26  
Moreover, a tug boat was positioned on the starboard bow of the Liberty Sun at all times, in 
order “to fend the ship off the [loading] terminal.”27 
The accident resulting in Barlow’s injury occurred three days after the mooring of the 
vessel alongside the terminal.28  At that time, one of the forward breast lines parted.29  The ship’s 
second mate was serving as “the watch officer when the line parted.”30  Upon seeing the parted 
line, the second mate immediately notified the ship’s Captain, who instructed him to assemble 
the crew and to re-attach the line.31  The Captain also instructed the Chief Engineer to start the 
ship’s engine.32   
                                                          
22 Id. 
23 Id.  
24 Id. at 520-21. 
25 Barlow, 746 F.3d at 521. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Barlow, 746 F.3d at 521. 
32 Id. at 522. 
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The situation continued to progress from bad to worse when roughly five minutes after 
the breast line parted, “the starboard bow line parted.”33  It appears that whenever an additional 
line parted, the remaining lines were placed under increased strain.34  At this point, the second 
mate “noted that the remaining forward lines were also in danger of snapping,” so he “ordered 
the boatswain to slacken the lines.”35  Based on the second mate’s description of the events, the 
court understood him to mean that the primary problem with the lines was that they were 
continuing to pay out slowly, despite the fact that the brakes controlling the lines were 
engaged.36  As the second mate and boatswain were handling the issue, the rest of the crew 
assembled and “Barlow was the last crew member to arrive on the scene.”37 
Despite being the last crew member on the ship to arrive, and although outranked by the 
second mate, Barlow attempted to take charge of the situation by first starting an argument with 
the second mate about the best manner in which to slacken the line.38  In response to Barlow, the 
second mate stated that other members of the crew were dealing with the issue and ordered 
Barlow to refrain from getting involved.39  Thereafter, Barlow tried to get the captain to 
intervene by unsuccessfully attempting to call him on the ship’s telephone system.40  When this 
failed, Barlow took matters into his own hands and addressed “one of the winches that controlled 
the forward mooring lines.”41 
                                                          
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id.  
36 Id. 
37 Barlow, 746 F.3d at 522. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id.  
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The court noted that the standard protocol “for operating a winch is to first start the 
motor,” before putting it in gear, and to only then release the brake.42  This method ensures that 
one either pays out or takes in the line using the motor as a means of controlling the speed at 
which the line pays out.43  But, Barlow decided to use his own method, instead of following 
protocol, which he calls “bumping the brake.”44  This method involved his “bump[ing]” the 
brake’s handle “to loosen the brake’s grip on the winch,” without engaging the motor.45  He 
stated that in his mind, “bumping the brake” would be quicker and save him from having to 
reach underneath the winch, near the precariously taut line, to start the motor.46  But in reality, 
Barlow’s actions resulted in the line paying out uncontrollably, whipping around the winch, and 
hitting him.47  After sustaining this injury, Barlow remained on the Liberty Sun for a week and 
received treatment locally.48  Nevertheless, his wound became infected, forcing him to return 
home to the United States.49   
In 2008, in the Eastern District of New York, Barlow brought this action “against his 
employer, the Liberty Sun in rem, and the various entities associated with its ownership, 
management, and operation, in personam.”50  He asserted claims for damages under a theory of 
negligence, as well as a claim of unseaworthiness against the owners of the vessel.51  Before 
trial, as a response to Liberty’s claim that Barlow was contributorily negligent, Barlow submitted 
proposed jury instructions implementing the Fourth Circuit’s “maritime rescue doctrine.”52  He 
                                                          
42 Id. 
43 Barlow, 746 F.3d at 522. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Barlow, 746 F.3d at 522. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
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argued that the rescue doctrine applied to him because in bumping the brake he was trying to 
rescue the ship and its crew from the danger of the parting lines.53  Under Barlow’s proposed 
instruction, before the jury could assign any fault to him for his own injuries, it would be 
required to find that his conduct rose to the level of “wanton and reckless” behavior.54   
The district court rejected Barlow’s suggested instructions and simply “gave an 
‘emergency’ instruction” instead.55  Under this instruction, the jury was told “to consider the fact 
that Barlow was in a position where he must act quickly without opportunity for reflection, and 
that it should hold him to the standard of a ‘reasonably prudent [seaman] . . . faced with the same 
emergency.’”56  The case went to trial in 2011, resulting in a jury verdict in favor of Defendants 
on the unseaworthiness claim, and a partial award of damages to Barlow on the negligence 
claim.57  The jury found Defendants to be ten percent at fault, thereby allocating ninety percent 
of the fault to Barlow.58  The jury totaled damages at $446,000.59  Therefore, Barlow was to 
recover only ten percent of the total damages, the portion of the damages allocable to Defendants 
-- $44,600.60 
In Barlow, the Second Circuit stated that if the Fourth Circuit’s approach were the law in 
the Second Circuit, it would have appropriately given an instruction on the rescue doctrine.61  
The Second Circuit recognized that it has previously applied a regular negligence standard, while 
also noting that the existence of an emergency was a factor to be considered in determining 
                                                          
53 Id. at 522-23. 
54 Id. 
55 Barlow, 746 F.3d at 523. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 See Id. 
61 Barlow, 746 F.3d at 525. 
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damages.62  The court reasoned that because comparative negligence applied, rather than 
contributory negligence, the rescue doctrine’s principal purpose – to encourage rescue – largely 
disappeared.63  Moreover, it stated that the Second Circuit’s precedent supported applying a 
reasonable person standard.64  The court ultimately found “no reason to adopt Barlow’s” 
recklessness standard and instead adopted a reasonable seaman standard, despite admitting that it 
is true that life on land is generally less dangerous than life at sea.65 
2. THE FURKA CASES FROM THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
a. FURKA I 
Deborah Furka, plaintiff appellant and the administratrix of the estate of Paul Furka, 
deceased, brought an action under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. § 30104,66 for negligence, and 
under general maritime law for the unseaworthiness of the vessel Paul Furka was operating when 
he perished.67  The case involved an alleged rescue attempt of a fellow employee by the decedent 
on the Chesapeake Bay.68  Deborah Furka is the widow of Paul Furka (hereafter “Furka”), who 
was employed as a surveyor “on a large marine dike construction project” near Baltimore at Hart 
and Miller Islands in Chesapeake Bay.69  The defendant, Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. 
(hereafter “Great Lakes”), was Furka’s employer.70  Furka held the position of “chief-of-party on 
the surveying team operating on a Boston Whaler.”71   
                                                          
62 Id. at 526. 
63 Id. 
64 Id.  
65 Id. 
66 The Jones Act allows a seaman, who is “injured in the course of employment,” or the personal representative of a 
seaman, who dies from such injuries, to bring a civil suit against the seaman’s employer.  46 U.S.C.S. § 30104 
(LexisNexis 2016). 
67 Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. (Furka I), 755 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir. 1985). 
68 Id. 
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 Id. 
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On a January day in 1982, a day of progressively rough weather and turbulent seas, one 
tug with a scow went adrift in the bay after losing its rudder and power.72  Thereafter, the captain 
of the tug radioed the base.73  What he exactly said over the radio is a matter of dispute.74  
According to plaintiff, the captain called requesting the removal of the scowman from his open 
boat, where he was “freezing to death,” due to being wet and cold.75  Defendant’s evidence 
suggested that the captain did not hint at an emergency, but simply requested assistance with the 
scow.76   
At the time of the captain’s call, no larger boats were available to rescue the disabled 
craft.77  Therefore, Furka took his sixteen-foot Boston Whaler into the rough water to save the 
scowman from the cold.78  But when Furka arrived at the scow, the stranded seaman refused to 
leave the boat.79  Furka then turned toward shore, and shortly thereafter began taking on water.80  
He radioed for assistance, but drowned before rescuers arrived.81  As mentioned above, Great 
Lakes denied the existence of any urgency to the tugboat captain’s call for help and claimed 
contributory negligence as a limitation against full recovery.82  
Following trial, the jury found Furka to qualify as a seaman and returned a verdict in the 
plaintiff’s favor on the negligence claim.83  The jury’s verdict favored the defendant on the 
unseaworthiness claim.84  The jury awarded $1,200,000 in damages for pecuniary loss, but 
                                                          
72 Id. 
73 Furka I, 755 F.2d at 1087. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Furka I, 755 F.2d at 1087. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 1087-88. 
83 Id. at 1088. 
84 Id. 
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limited Furka’s recovery by finding him to have been 65% contributorily negligent.85  Therefore, 
judgment was entered for the plaintiff in the amount of $420,000.86  Mrs. Furka appealed that 
verdict.87   
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit stated that the trial court’s jury instruction “failed to inform 
the jury that no contributory negligence may be inferred from a rescue attempt alone and further 
that no comparative fault may be assessed unless plaintiff’s conduct was wanton or reckless.”88  
The Fourth Circuit summarized the common law rescue doctrine stating, “The law has so high a 
regard for human life that it will not impute negligence to an effort to preserve it, unless made 
under such circumstances as to constitute rashness.”89  The court acknowledged that the rescue 
doctrine developed when contributory negligence was the rule, but nevertheless concluded that 
admiralty law must be very hospitable to a man’s impulse to rescue.90  The court additionally 
noted that in an emergency, a rescuer should not be punished for judgment errors, given the fact 
that confusion is a natural product of an urgent situation.91  Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit 
highlighted how the law wants to encourage swift responses stating, “[i]n rescue, promptness 
may be prudence,” and explained that using a reckless conduct standard importantly reflects the 
public policy purpose behind the rescue doctrine.92   
                                                          
85 Furka I, 755 F.2d at 1088. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. (citing Scott v. John H. Hampshire, Inc., 246 Md. 171 (1967) (quoting Maryland Steel Co. v. Marney, 88 Md. 
428 (1898)).  See also Altamuro v. Milner Hotel, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Brown v. National Oil Co., 
233 S.C. 345 (1958); Andrews v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 192 Va. 150 (1951) (noting that an elevated 
regard for human life led to the adoption of a rash or reckless conduct standard). 
90 Furka I, 755 F.2d at 1088-89. 
91 Id. at 1088 (citing Corbin v. Philadelphia, 195 Pa. 461 (1900)). See also Rodgers v. Carter, 266 N.C. 564 (1966); 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 470(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1965) (recognizing the rapid decision making that results 
from an emergency).  
92 Furka I, 755 F.2d at 1088-89. 
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The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the case holding that the lower court’s jury 
instruction regarding contributory negligence was plain error, since it did not reference the 
unique context of rescue.93   
b. FURKA II 
At the second trial, the court instructed the jury that “the decedent was not at fault if he 
believed that a rescue was required and if a reasonably prudent person would have perceived the 
need for a rescue.”94  The parties agreed to a special verdict form placing two questions before 
the jury: (1) whether a rescue situation existed, and if so, (2) whether the plaintiff rescuer’s 
behavior during the rescue was wanton or reckless.95  The judge told the jury that in deciding 
whether a rescue situation manifested they should consider the following: (1) “did Mr. Furka 
perceive the need for a rescue?” and (2) “if so, was there cause based on all the surrounding 
circumstances for a reasonably prudent person to have perceived the call to rescue and thereby 
launch the effort of the attempt?”96   
The jury answered the first special verdict query in the negative, finding that no rescue 
situation existed in this case.97  Since the jury found that no rescue situation existed, the first 
jury’s finding that the decedent negligently contributed to his injuries was adopted.98  Therefore, 
following the second trial, Mrs. Furka was again awarded damages of $420,000, reduced through 
the application of comparative negligence.99   
Mrs. Furka then appealed to the Fourth Circuit once again, arguing that the trial court 
erred by instructing the jury to apply a reasonable person standard to the perception aspect of the 
                                                          
93 Id. at 1088. 
94 Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. (Furka II), 824 F.2d 330, 331 (4th Cir. 1987). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
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rescue, and that the reckless and wanton standard should have been applied to both facets of the 
rescue doctrine – the rescuer’s actions and the rescuer’s perception of the need for a rescue 
attempt.100  On appeal in Furka II, Great Lakes conceded that Furka’s conduct must be evaluated 
under a reckless and wanton standard, however, the company contended that Furka’s “perception 
of the need for a rescue should be measured against that of a reasonably prudent person,” 
pointing to instances in the terrestrial tort context when a bifurcated standard has been applied.101   
In response, the Fourth Circuit stated its belief that bifurcating the rescue doctrine would 
trivialize it.102  Citing Wagner, the court asserted that in the context of rescue, perception and 
response are inseparable because both will be undertaken against the same backdrop of stress and 
imperfect knowledge.103  The court declared that bifurcating the standard “is to have angels 
dancing . . . on the head of the proverbial pin.”104  Consequently, the Fourth Circuit held that the 
wanton and reckless standard is the correct standard to be applied under the rescue doctrine, in 
admiralty, for both the perception of the need to rescue and the rescuer’s conduct.105   
3. OTHER CIRCUITS INVOLVED IN THE SPLIT 
In Wharf v. Burlington N. R.R., the Ninth Circuit explicitly sided with the Fourth Circuit 
on the appropriate standard to be applied to a rescuer’s conduct.106  After finding that the 
plaintiff rescuer suffered injury in connection with his rescue attempt, the court applied the 
wanton and reckless conduct standard under the rescue doctrine, citing Furka I.107  The Ninth 
Circuit then further explained that the evidence merely showed that the plaintiff rescuer “tripped 
                                                          
100 Furka II, 824 F.2d at 331. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 332. 
104 Id.  
105 Id. 
106 60 F.3d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1995). 
107 Id. 
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while looking away from his direction of travel,” which “could constitute negligence,” but “does 
not amount to reckless or wanton” behavior.108 
E. TERRESTRIAL TORT RESCUE CASES AND GOOD SAMARITAN STATUTES 
In the context of rescue on dry land, some jurisdictions appear to follow the Second 
Circuit’s approach by applying reasonableness standards to both the perception and conduct 
aspects of the rescue doctrine.109  For instance, the Appellate Court in Connecticut stated that 
since contributory negligence is no longer a total bar to recovery, it believed the rescue doctrine 
does nothing more to aid injured rescuers in their attempts to recover damages than to help 
establish the causal connection between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s injury.110  
However, other jurisdictions take another approach. 
A bifurcated standard has been used under the rescue doctrine in a variety of cases 
involving torts which occurred on dry land.111  A bifurcated standard refers to the idea that the 
rescue doctrine has two separate aspects: a perception aspect and a conduct aspect.112  In these 
terrestrial tort cases utilizing such a split standard, a reasonableness standard is applied to the 
                                                          
108 Id. 
109 See Ryder Truck Rental v. Korte, 357 So. 2d 228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Sweetman v. State Highway Dep’t, 
357 N.W.2d 783 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Beatty v. Davis, 400 N.W.2d 850, 855 (Neb. 1987); Hughes v. Murnane 
Bldg. Contrs., Inc., 932 N.Y.S.2d 782, 784 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011); Calvert v. Ourum, 595 P/2d 1264, 1267 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1979); French v. Chase, 297 P.2d 235, 239 (Wash. 1956). 
110 Zimny v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 513 A.2d 1235, 1243 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986). 
111 See Dinsmoore v. Board of Trustees of Memorial Hosp., 936 F.2d 505, 507 (10th Cir. 1991); Solgaard v. Guy F. 
Atkinson Co., 491 P.2d 821, 825 (Cal. 1971); Walker Hauling Co. v. Johnson, 139 S.E.2d 496, 499 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1964); Padilla v. Hooks Int’l, Inc., 654 P.2d 574, 578 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); Skaling v. Aetna Ins. Co., 799 A.2d 
997 n.11 (R.I. 2002); Ouellette v. Carde, 612 A.2d 687, 690 (R.I. 1992); Commonwealth v. Millsaps, 352 S.E.2d 
311,313 (Va. 1987); Dubus v. Dresser Indus., 649 P.2d 198, 206 (Wyo. 1982).  
112 See Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. (Furka II), 824 F.2d 330, 331 (4th Cir. 1987). 
15 
 
perception aspect, while a recklessness standard is applied to the conduct aspect.113  Such a 
bifurcated approach was taken at the second trial following Furka I.114 
The terrestrial tort cases using the bifurcated standard encompass a wide array of 
emergencies, exemplifying its versatility.  The factual situations under which it was applied 
include: when a car drove through the front window of a commercial structure,115 when a boy on 
a bicycle was hit by a car,116 when a car rolled down a driveway and into a ravine,117 and 
following an incident where a state trooper endeavored to create a roadblock to stop a speeding 
motorist from evading the authorities,118 just to name a few. 
Good Samaritan statutes protect people who choose to aid others who are injured.119  
Historically, such laws have been intended to decrease the hesitation of bystanders to help an 
injured party.120   Bystander hesitation often results from fear of suit or prosecution for 
unintentional injury or wrongful death.121  Good Samaritan statutes vary from state to state.  
Although certain states impose an affirmative obligation on people to provide assistance to 
injured parties, if they can do so without placing anyone in peril, the majority of states do not 
impose such an obligation.122  Instead, most states provide protection from civil and/or criminal 
                                                          
113 See Dinsmoore v. Board of Trustees of Memorial Hosp., 936 F.2d 505, 507 (10th Cir. 1991); Solgaard v. Guy F. 
Atkinson Co., 491 P.2d 821, 825 (Cal. 1971); Walker Hauling Co. v. Johnson, 139 S.E.2d 496, 499 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1964); Padilla v. Hooks Int’l, Inc., 654 P.2d 574, 578 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); Skaling v. Aetna Ins. Co., 799 A.2d 
997 n.11 (R.I. 2002); Ouellette v. Carde, 612 A.2d 687, 690 (R.I. 1992); Commonwealth v. Millsaps, 352 S.E.2d 
311,313 (Va. 1987); Dubus v. Dresser Indus., 649 P.2d 198, 206 (Wyo. 1982). 
114 Furka II, 824 F.2d at 331. 
115 Wolff v. Light, 169 N.W.2d 93, 98 (N.D. 1969). 
116 Marks v. Wagner, 370 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977). 
117 Simmons v. Carwell, 10 So. 3d 576 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008). 
118 Commonwealth v. Millsaps, 352 S.E.2d 311 (Va. 1987). 
119 See David Weldon, Comment, Forgotten Namesake: The Illinois Good Samaritan Act’s Inexcusable Failure to 
Provide Immunity to Non-Medical Rescuers, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1097, 1105 (2010). 
120 See Id. 
121 See Weldon, supra note 119, at 1103-05. 
122 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2016) (imposing affirmative duty to aid endangered person if capable of 
doing so safely); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 6801 (2016) (no imposition of duty to aid); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-
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liability to anyone who provides assistance to injured parties, provided that all the statutory 
requirements are met.123 
Despite the variations in Good Samaritan laws, such statutes typically contain three basic 
requirements: (1) the rendering of emergency aid; (2) in good faith; and (3) rendered 
gratuitously.124  The standard of care for those voluntarily providing emergency assistance may 
vary by jurisdiction.  Despite some variation among jurisdictions, the applicable standards of 
care are relatively lenient in accordance with the altruistic purpose of Good Samaritan laws.125 
F. MARITIME LAW’S HISTORICALLY GENEROUS PROVISION OF SEAMAN’S REMEDIES 
Historically, seamen have been provided with a variety of remedies for their worker 
injury claims.  They consequently fared better than their land-based counterparts, whose claims 
against their employers for work-related injuries often failed.126  In large part, these claims failed 
because of the doctrine of contributory negligence, which acted as a complete bar to the plaintiff 
employee’s recovery if the plaintiff was found even slightly negligent.127  However, even while 
contributory negligence functioned as a total bar to recovery, seamen had the remedies of 
maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness available to them.128   
In 1903, the Supreme Court noted that if a seaman falls ill or is wounded while serving a 
ship, the vessel and its owners are liable for the seaman’s maintenance and cure (akin to worker 
compensation) and for the seaman’s wages, at least until the end of the voyage.129  The Court 
also stated that the vessel and its owners are additionally liable to a seaman for injuries the 
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seaman sustains because of the unseaworthiness of the ship or because of a failure to properly 
maintain the ship’s appurtenances.130  Therefore, even before Congress provided seamen the 
ability to bring a negligence action against their employers, based on the fault of co-employees 
or the employer’s own failures, seaman had other valuable remedies. 
G. THE JONES ACT 
This article pays special attention to the Jones Act, since both of the principal cases on 
either side of the circuit split involve fact patterns ripe for Jones Act claims.  The Jones Act 
allows one qualified as a “seaman,” who is injured in the course of employment, or the personal 
representative of a “seaman” killed as a result of such injury, to launch a civil action at law 
against their employer.131  Congress enacted the Jones Act leaving it up to the courts, in large 
part, to fashion remedies for injured employees in a manner analogous to tort remedies 
developed at common law.132  Moreover, although admiralty law generally denies a litigant the 
right to a jury trial, Jones Act claims explicitly provide injured seamen “with the right of trial by 
jury.”133   
By extending the provisions of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) to apply to 
negligence claims brought by seamen against their employers under the Jones Act, the Jones Act 
further states that any of our country’s laws regulating a railway employee’s recovery for 
personal injury or death apply to seamen.134  Congress had previously adopted FELA, which 
granted interstate railroad workers the ability to bring negligence claims against their 
employers.135  FELA essentially held railroad employers liable, through respondeat superior, for 
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a co-employee’s negligence causing injury to a fellow employee.136  Furthermore, it abolished 
the defenses of assumption of risk and the fellow servant rules, and stated that contributory 
negligence merely reduced recovery.137   
III. ANALYSIS 
A. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR BORROWING FROM TERRESTRIAL TORTS 
This article’s proposed solution to this circuit split is admittedly novel, especially because 
it is founded upon the idea that one attempting to resolve an admiralty tort issue can look outside 
the law of admiralty for ideas and suggestions.  Nevertheless, the idea of borrowing from 
terrestrial tort law to develop a solution to this particular admiralty tort issue may not appear 
unusual after one familiarizes themselves with the following considerations, including the 
aforementioned Jones Act and its incorporation of FELA’s provisions.138 
Outside of the Jones Act context, there exist a few other general similarities between 
admiralty tort law and terrestrial tort law.  For example, it appears that maritime law will 
generally follow the common law governing intentional torts.139  Furthermore, many general 
maritime tort cases involve theories of strict liability and negligence; and general maritime law 
has both borrowed from and supplied the general common law for torts with regards to 
negligence.  For instance, the famous “Learned Hand” formula, which defines negligence, first 
appeared in a maritime case.140  Additionally, in both maritime tort cases and terrestrial tort 
cases, the element of duty principally turns on the foreseeability of the risk.141  And with regards 
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to the question of “breach,” which asks whether a defendant failed to act reasonably, the 
maritime and common law approaches generally coincide.142  Therefore, admiralty law’s historic 
borrowing from terrestrial torts supports the notion of borrowing the bifurcated standard from the 
common law of rescue and applying it to the maritime rescue doctrine. 
B. IN SUPPORT OF A RECKLESSNESS CONDUCT STANDARD: AGREEMENT WITH FURKA 
1. DIFFERENCES IN DUTY – BETWEEN JONES ACT EMPLOYER & RESCUE DOCTRINE PLAINTIFF 
Maritime law rejects the distinctions often drawn in common law jurisdictions between 
“trespassers,” “licensees,” and “invitees,” and instead imposes a duty of reasonable care to 
everyone lawfully aboard a vessel, and upon the owner or operator of said vessel.143  This is 
indistinguishable from the duty an employer owes his seamen, according to at least one federal 
court that has addressed the matter.144  In Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., the Fifth Circuit 
found that employer negligence is the essence of a Jones Act claim, that such negligence is the 
failure to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances, and that the employer thereby owes a 
duty of reasonable care to their employees.145  Therefore, Jones Act employers are held to a 
reasonable person standard.  But with this point in mind, the logical conclusion is that a seaman 
rescuer ought to be held to a different conduct standard – a standard other than reasonableness – 
in part because of the lack of a duty.   
As previously stated, Jones Act employers have an affirmative duty to act with a certain 
level of care towards their employees.146  The Jones Act holds employers liable for the 
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negligence of any of its employees through its incorporation of FELA.147  But, in order for this 
negligence to be imputed to the employer, the negligence must be within the scope and course of 
the offending party’s employment.148  Building on the idea of control inherent in this conception 
of duty, the Supreme Court has previously ruled that a Jones Act employer cannot delegate to a 
third party, and thus escape liability for, any act which is “a vital part of the ship’s total 
operations.”149  Therefore, it appears that the relevant inquiry when determining whether a Jones 
Act employer owes a duty to a particular party is the same inquiry that is used at common law 
generally, i.e., did the defendant/employer maintain control over the way in which the work was 
completed by the tortfeasor?  If so, the employer is deemed to have been in sufficient control of 
the tortfeasor and liability is imputed to the employer.150   
In contrast, even at sea, as in Barlow and the Furka cases, no independent duty existed 
for the plaintiff employees to attempt rescues.151  Indeed, the voluntary nature of an attempted 
rescue is a key element of the rescue doctrine’s application.  The significance of the selflessness 
of the rescue is illustrated in Ouellette v. Carde, where the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
explained that the rescue doctrine was developed for two reasons: (1) to encourage rescue (by 
those necessarily under no pre-existing duty to help), and (2) to correct the inequity of barring 
relief under contributory negligence “to a person who is injured in a rescue attempt which the 
injured person was under no duty to undertake.”152  This lack of a duty makes perfect sense 
because one employee typically exercises far less control, if any, over a co-worker, as compared 
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to an employer.  Thus, given the lack of a duty under the rescue doctrine, an injured rescuer 
employee’s conduct should be held to a lower standard of care than that applied to an employer’s 
conduct.   
Nevertheless, it has been held that a Jones Act plaintiff does owe a duty of reasonable 
care to someone – himself.  In Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., the Fifth Circuit held that the 
employee has a duty to utilize reasonable care under the circumstances with regards to his own 
safety.153  Even if an employee is characterized as owing himself a duty, it remains true that 
some rescuers, such as those plaintiffs involved on either side of the split, did not have an 
affirmative duty to rescue the victims.154  Using different standards of care for oneself and for 
others makes sense if one considers the application of a lower standard of care to rescuer conduct 
a sort of device used to incentivize the voluntary rescue of others.155   
If a lower standard of care with regards to one’s conduct, such as a recklessness standard, 
is employed in order to spur would-be-rescuers to freely and selflessly undertake rescues156, it 
would make little sense to apply this lower standard to self-preservation.  Self-preservation is 
arguably the most natural, and universally held, human instinct.  Almost anyone in their right 
mind will generally strive to save themselves within reason.  Therefore, the duty of care owed to 
oneself is a duty that does not need to be promoted or incentivized in the same way that the law 
needs to encourage people to voluntarily come to the aid of others.  Therefore, it is logical to 
apply different standards of care to the saving of others and the saving of oneself, given the 
inherent differences between selfless and selfish behavior. 
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2. BARLOW’S APPROACH: THEMATICALLY INCONSISTENT WITH THE JONES ACT 
Additionally, a plaintiff’s burden of proof with regards to causation under the Jones Act 
reflects the statute’s apparent purpose – to place increased responsibility on the employer and to 
allow the plaintiff employee to recover with greater ease.  In the First Circuit, it was held that the 
Jones Act plaintiff’s burden of proof on causation is “featherweight.”157  As a result, liability will 
be found to exist under this statute so long as the employer’s negligence contributed to the 
seaman’s injury in the slightest way.158  This burden of proof seems quite easy to carry. 
The placement of this lower burden of proof on the Jones Act plaintiff seems to comport 
with the statute’s purpose since it was enacted “to enlarge, not to narrow, protection afforded to 
seamen by maritime law” and for the protection and benefit of seamen, who are considered the 
peculiar wards of admiralty.159  The remedies afforded to seamen and their dependents under this 
statute were designed to protect those who perform services onboard vessels and are 
subsequently exposed to the unique hazards of the sea.160  The Supreme Court has stated that this 
is a remedial statute intended to be liberally construed, in order to further its purpose of 
protecting its wards.161  Consequently, a hybrid solution to the circuit split, which increases the 
likelihood of full recovery of damages for an injured rescuer plaintiff in the maritime context, 
reflects the purpose and construction of the Jones Act, while Barlow’s full adoption of the 
reasonableness standard conflicts with the Act. 
3. CRITICISM OF BARLOW: IGNORING THE RESCUE DOCTRINE’S PUBLIC POLICY PURPOSE 
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It proves problematic that in Barlow, the Second Circuit centers its discussion on 
contributory negligence.  In Barlow, the court focuses too much on the fact that contributory 
negligence is no longer a total bar to recovery.  It states that “[u]nder the district court’s jury 
charge, a rescuer may be held liable for actions that were merely unreasonable under the 
circumstances.”162  The Second Circuit chose to adopt the district court’s standard of care.163  
Through the court’s adoption of reasonableness as the standard of care to be applied to all 
aspects of the rescue doctrine, the court in effect retired the rescue doctrine (at least in the 
maritime context).  This characterization of the court’s decision in Barlow as essentially retiring 
the rescue doctrine is supported by the fact that the court focuses in large part on only one of the 
two purposes underlying the formation of this common law doctrine.  The purpose it chose to 
center on was contributory negligence’s function as a complete bar to recovery when the rescue 
doctrine initially developed.164 
After the Second Circuit announced its choice to adopt a reasonable person standard, the 
next paragraph of the court’s opinion discussed how Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century 
courts generally assumed, with regards to contributory negligence, that courts should “let losses 
lie where they fell” in instances “where both parties were blameworthy.”165  The court then 
continued to center its attention on the fact that the rescue doctrine was developed by courts as a 
method to mitigate the harshness of contributory negligence as a total bar to recovery.166  It is 
true that the doctrine helped avoid contributory negligence’s severe consequences by carving out 
an exception to the rule.  Yet, given all this attention to contributory negligence, it appears that 
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the Second Circuit primarily focused on the historical atmosphere under which the rescue 
doctrine grew, without fully recognizing that the doctrine has a second, even greater purpose 
behind it – the public policy purpose that prompted the creation of the rescue doctrine in the first 
place.   
In the Second Circuit’s defense, the court does appear to acknowledge this underlying 
policy purpose as it does briefly mention that “[a]lthough courts applying the doctrine of 
contributory negligence may have been willing to deny recovery to a person whose negligence 
precipitated an emergency, they hesitated before applying it to someone who voluntarily exposed 
himself to danger in order to rescue others . . . to protect would-be rescuers, courts created the 
rescue doctrine.”167  But despite this acknowledgement, the Second Circuit fails to adequately 
emphasize how general considerations of fairness compelled the creation of the rescue doctrine.   
The court does acknowledge, however, that the clearest articulation of the rescue doctrine 
in the maritime context was provided by the Fourth Circuit in Furka I and Furka II.168  
Additionally, Barlow quotes the most important passage of Furka I, which clearly establishes 
policy considerations, such as the promotion of societal values, as the primary reason for its 
adoption of the wanton and reckless conduct standard under the rescue doctrine.169  In Furka I, 
the court held that the rescuer-decedent “could not be found contributorily liable unless his 
rescue attempt was wanton or reckless.”170  The Fourth Circuit reasoned that, “The wanton and 
reckless standard reflects the value society places upon rescues as much as any desire to avoid a 
total defeat of recovery under common law.  Law must encourage an environment where human 
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instinct is not insular but responds to the plight of another in peril.”171  Nonetheless, the Second 
Circuit chose to ignore Furka I’s emphasis on the underlying public policy purpose, in favor of 
concentrating its attention on the fact that times have changed since the creation of the rescue 
doctrine.   
 Yet, encouraging voluntary rescues remains an extremely important objective.  The 
public policy goal of encouraging voluntary rescues when life is endangered pervades American 
law.  In Gardner v. Loomis Armored, the court addressed the issue of “whether an employer 
contravenes public policy when it terminates an at-will employee” for violating a company 
regulation in order to assist a citizen in danger of serious injury or death.172  There, the court 
reasoned that terminating even an at-will employee for such a violation contradicted public 
policy because the plaintiff-employee’s conduct unmistakably served the policy of encouraging 
citizens to rescue others from death or serious injury.173  The court also reasoned that if our 
society has previously placed the rescue of human life above the criminal code and constitutional 
rights, then this employee’s conduct obviously trumps a company’s work rule.174  For example, 
what would typically be an illegal use of force is lawful when used to protect others or oneself 
from injury.175  Moreover, Fourth Amendment protection from warrantless searches is waived 
under certain exigent circumstances, such as when the search is essential to avoid physical harm 
to officers or others.176 Thus, the court held that this rule contravened public policy.177   
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 Our law has also pursued the related public policy goal of protecting Good Samaritans.178 
In State v. Hillman, the Washington Court of Appeals held that the victim’s status as a ‘Good 
Samaritan,’ who came to his murderer’s aid, was a valid aggravating factor to consider during 
sentencing.179  Reaching this conclusion, the court reflected that it “has long been the policy of 
our law to protect the ‘Good Samaritan.’”180  Therefore, it is highly problematic that the Second 
Circuit chose to emphasize the rescue doctrine’s ties to contributory negligence at the expense of 
the public policy concerns underlying the doctrine. 
4. BARLOW’S MISTAKE REGARDING COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 
Moreover, Barlow mistakenly believes that comparative negligence abrogates the rescue 
doctrine.  The court praises the use of comparative fault given that its application allows “even a 
negligent rescuer” to recover something, as George Barlow did.181  Subsequently, because a 
rescuer will still have a chance at partial recovery for her injuries, the Second Circuit states, “the 
principle justification for the rescue doctrine – encouraging rescue – has largely disappeared.”182  
But, just because a reasonable person standard combined with a comparative negligence regime 
will not automatically preclude a partially negligent rescuer from any recovery whatsoever, does 
not mean that the need to encourage selfless behavior during life’s most dangerous moments has 
diminished, more-less disappeared.  As Furka I illustrates, encouraging voluntary assistance in 
the face of great risk is a primary purpose behind the creation of the rescue doctrine; otherwise 
courts would not have felt the need to form an exception to the original contributory negligence 
rule in the first place.183  Courts would not have “hesitated before applying [contributory 
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negligence as a total bar to recovery] to someone who voluntarily exposed himself to danger in 
order to rescue others from it,” if they did not view would-be rescuers as a special class 
deserving such a break.184 
Barlow fails to adequately emphasize the fact that Furka I acknowledged the change in 
law, the adoption of a comparative negligence regime.  The Second Circuit ends its discussion of 
Barlow’s negligence claim by highlighting that “Furka admits, the rescue doctrine came from a 
time when the rescuer’s slightest misstep could cost him any recovery whatsoever.  That is no 
longer the case.”185  Yet, the court does not point out that the court in Furka I consciously 
adopted the wanton and reckless conduct standard, regardless of this change, for a more 
important reason. 
Tradition supports the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in favor of the wanton and reckless 
conduct standard in Furka I.  There, the court noted that “[t]his is the standard [that has been] 
traditionally applied to the conduct of plaintiffs in rescue situations.”186  Yet despite the 
persuasiveness of a long-standing tradition of using a lower standard of care in the rescue 
context, the Fourth Circuit does not blindly follow tradition without recognizing relevant 
changes that have been made in the arena of apportioning fault.  Rather, the court in Furka I 
considers the fact that the reckless and wanton standard “developed under common law, where 
contributory negligence was a complete bar to recovery,” and the fact that “[i]n some 
comparative negligence jurisdictions, not in admiralty, the wanton and reckless standard has thus 
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been diluted.”187  Yet, it is equally true that some jurisdictions adopting comparative negligence 
have not diluted the rescue doctrine’s use of the reckless and wanton conduct standard.188 
Several states, in a terrestrial tort context, have chosen to apply a reckless and wanton 
conduct standard under the rescue doctrine, while also adhering to comparative negligence 
systems.189  The Supreme Court in Kansas reasoned that the rescue doctrine’s reckless conduct 
standard and comparative negligence could co-exist since it remained sound policy to promote 
rescue efforts.190  The court noted that using a heightened conduct standard under the rescue 
doctrine, such as a reasonableness standard, would “tend to operate as a deterrent to potential 
rescuers and penalize acts which would constitute ordinary negligence, but would not rise to the 
level of rash conduct.”191  The court wisely feared that such a holding “would be one more 
weapon in the arsenal of the ‘don’t-get-involved’ creed of citizenship,” which the court found to 
be “already too prevalent.”192  The court further reasoned that despite the state legislature’s 
adoption of comparative negligence, it has continued to utilize a standard of care lower than 
reasonableness in other statutes governing the handling of emergencies, namely its Good 
Samaritan statutes, which result in less liability for rescuers.193  The court also noted that the 
state’s Good Samaritan statute has been frequently amended since comparative negligence was 
implemented, so it is clear that the statute continues to exist intentionally, and not as the result of 
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oversight.194  Therefore, a comparative negligence system does not prevent the use of limited 
liability as an incentive for would-be rescuers faced with a crisis.  Barlow incorrectly concludes 
that the advent of comparative negligence necessarily abrogated the rescue doctrine. 
5. THE ADDITIONAL HURDLES RESCUER PLAINTIFFS MUST FACE 
Kansas is not alone in its dual adoption of comparative negligence and a reckless conduct 
standard.  Missouri has also shown that these two concepts can co-exist.195  In Missouri, 
comparative negligence has supplanted the rule of contributory negligence.196  The intention 
behind this change was to eliminate the inherent inequality of a doctrine that forced one party to 
take total responsibility for the conduct of both parties involved.197  It could be argued that this is 
essentially what would occur through the use of the bifurcated standard if an injured rescuer 
plaintiff’s conduct does not rise to the level of recklessness, thereby cutting them a break and 
allowing their full recovery of damages.  Yet, that result would still be fair, although involving 
one party’s bearing the full responsibility for the conduct of both parties, because the suggested 
standard only applies in a narrow category of circumstances to a limited class of rescuers.  Thus, 
under the bifurcated standard, this seemingly inequitable result remains fair because the 
defendant’s negligence must have caused the peril that invites the rescue attempt.198  It is 
equitable to force the defendant to bear more of the burden with regards to damages when it was 
the defendant’s negligence that necessitated the injured rescuer’s involvement in the first place. 
In Missouri, the court noted how a defendant’s negligence remains a prerequisite to a 
plaintiff’s recovery in this situation stating, “[t]o maintain an action premised on the rescue 
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doctrine, the plaintiff must allege that the negligence of the defendant endangered the safety of 
another, and that the plaintiff sustained injuries in an attempt to save the other from injury.”199 
This statement not only demonstrates that a defendant’s negligence is one of the initial hurdles a 
plaintiff must clear to avail themselves of the rescue doctrine, but a particular sort of negligence 
must be committed by the defendant, in order for a plaintiff to use the rescue doctrine.  
Additionally, the court stated that two different standards can potentially apply to rescuer 
conduct: an ordinary negligence standard if the rescuer created the situation of peril prompting 
the rescue attempt, and a rash or reckless standard if the rescuer was aiding another, without 
having any involvement in the creation of the initial danger.200  This distinction further 
demonstrates the importance of differentiating between rescuers who create the emergency and 
those that do not.  The Alabama Supreme Court also emphasized how important it is for a 
plaintiff to provide evidence of a defendant’s negligence.201  This is a basic prerequisite to a 
plaintiff’s recovery on a negligence theory, however, as a practical matter it functions as yet 
another hurdle that the plaintiff must clear.  The existence of multiple hurdles on the road to an 
injured rescuer’s recovery further justifies carving out a narrow category where rescuers are held 
to a lower conduct standard. 
Furthermore, application of a recklessness standard to the conduct aspect of the rescue 
doctrine would minimize confusion.  While choosing to employ a reckless conduct standard 
under the rescue doctrine, despite its acceptance of comparative negligence, the Court of Appeals 
in Georgia noted how a reasonableness standard could promote confusion.202  The court 
emphasized how the commonplace understanding of the phrase “ordinary care” seems 
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incongruent with a person’s voluntary placement of themselves in harm’s way.203  The court also 
considered jury confusion a possible byproduct of a reasonableness standard’s use in a rescue 
context, since a jury would necessarily be told that “the rescue doctrine inherently considers an 
assumption of risk as ingrained in the hazard created by the defendant’s negligence,” eliminating 
assumption of risk as a defense under the rescue doctrine.204  Consequently, a recklessness 
standard of care seems the most natural and least confusing standard to apply to conduct in the 
rescue context. 
 
 
C. IN SUPPORT OF A REASONABLE PERCEPTION STANDARD: AGREEMENT WITH BARLOW 
 In Barlow, the Second Circuit perceptively states that “unreasonable rescues injure 
people just as surely as the emergency that begets them. . . . Indeed, under [Barlow’s proposed] 
rule, defendant would be liable even if no reasonable mariner would have even thought there was 
an emergency, let alone taken the actions Barlow did.”205  Barlow proposed applying the rescue 
doctrine as it is described by the Fourth Circuit in Furka II.  This article agrees with the Second 
Circuit that the Fourth Circuit’s application of a recklessness standard to the perception aspect of 
the rescue doctrine would pose a problem.  As the Second Circuit clearly stated above, 
application of the recklessness standard to one’s perception of a situation would lead to easier 
recovery for even those plaintiffs who involve themselves in what no reasonable seaman would 
possibly consider an emergency situation.  Such a standard would allow an injured rescuer to 
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recover full damages though they were unreasonable in assessing the situation as an emergency 
from the start.  This result ought to be avoided. 
 Furka II explicitly rejects the idea that the rescue doctrine could be bifurcated so that 
different standards are applied to perception and conduct.206  In its discussion of the standard to 
be applied to the perception aspect of the rescue doctrine, the court in Furka II cited to the 
earliest application of the rescue doctrine, Wagner v. International R. Co.207  The Fourth Circuit 
cites Wagner’s statement that “[t]he law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing 
conduct to its consequences.  It recognizes them as normal.”208  It appears that Furka II noted 
this in an effort to demonstrate how the perception of an emergency and the subsequent handling 
of that emergency are closely linked.   
It is true that conduct often quickly follows perception; however, when this quote from 
Wagner is considered in the context of the entire paragraph, rather than in isolation, it is clear 
that this statement was made during a discussion of proximate causation and was intended to 
mean that it is natural for the plight of another to cause a rescuer to respond.  The sentences 
directly following the above quote state, “It places [the rescuers’] effects within the range of the 
natural and probable.  The wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the imperiled victim; it is a 
wrong also to his rescuer.  The state that leaves an opening in a bridge is liable to the child that 
falls into the stream, but liable also to the parent who plunges to its aid.”209  The paragraph ends 
with the statement, “The wrongdoer may not have foreseen the coming of a deliverer.  He is 
accountable as if he had.”210  Moreover, possibly the most oft quoted line from Wagner supports 
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the conclusion that the court focuses its discussion on causation issues.  The famous words, 
“Danger invites rescue.  The cry of distress is the summons of relief,” highlight a causal link in 
the chain of events.211  The court’s statements in Wagner highlight the inextricable causal link, 
and do not indicate that it is impossible to separately analyze a rescuer’s perception and a 
rescuer’s conduct.   
While rejecting the possibility of using a bifurcated standard under the rescue doctrine, 
the Fourth Circuit in Furka II also notes that rescue results, “more from the impulse to aid than 
from any process of thought or measure of reflection.”212  That is true, and that is why this 
article’s proposed standard does not call for deep reflection or certain verification that an 
emergency exists, but rather a rescuer’s reasonable belief under the circumstances that there is an 
emergency.  If the rescue doctrine’s ultimate policy goal is to facilitate the saving of lives, the 
law ought to temper the desire to endorse a wide-variety of rescue techniques, in the hopes of 
saving imperiled persons more often, with the desire to also protect rescuers from suffering 
injuries for naught. 
Courts have recognized a difference between requiring a reasonable belief that an 
emergency exists and actual proof of an emergency.  For example, the Missouri Court of 
Appeals stated that a certain individual must face actual danger before another person can 
justifiably act at his own risk to avert a casualty.213  The court explained that “[i]t is sufficient if 
the situation presented is such as to induce a reasonable belief that some person is in imminent 
peril.  The intending rescuer may act, with danger to himself if he reasonably had the right to 
assume or believe that the life or limb of another person is in peril.”214  Recognizing this 
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distinction makes it easier to clear the rescue doctrine’s first hurdle – reasonable perception – by 
accounting for a point Wagner makes, which is that a rescuer is usually under a great deal of 
stress and armed with imperfect knowledge when judging the need for a rescue.  Wyoming and 
Alabama also consider reasonable belief to sufficiently satisfy the reasonableness standard as 
applied to perception.215 
Additionally, a reasonable perception standard promotes the just functioning of the rescue 
doctrine.216  The rescue doctrine can only work fairly if it works in a way consistent with 
proximate causation, which typically centers on a determination of what is reasonably 
foreseeable.217  The rescue doctrine is premised on the idea that when a defendant acts 
negligently, the defendant can anticipate a rescue attempt.218  This idea mirrors the preceding 
discussion of proximate cause in Wagner.219  The Fourth Circuit in Furka II seriously erred by 
adopting a reckless or wanton standard to assess a rescuer’s belief that a rescue attempt is 
necessary because that implies that even unreasonable rescue attempts are foreseeable to a 
defendant.220  The idea that one must expect people to intervene and attempt a rescue in a 
situation that no reasonable person would consider an emergency is patently unfair and conflicts 
with general conceptions of proximate causation.  Therefore, reasonableness needs to be applied 
to the perception aspect of the rescue doctrine. 
D. GOOD SAMARITAN STATUTES AKIN TO A BIFURCATED STANDARD 
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 Additionally, numerous states’ Good Samaritan statutes utilize standards which 
essentially function the same way that a bifurcated standard would under the rescue doctrine.  
For example, Iowa utilizes a reckless, wanton, or willful conduct standard in its Good Samaritan 
statute, while also limiting the extent to which the statute applies through its inclusion of a 
handful of other requirements.221  These additional limitations act similarly to the way in which a 
reasonable perception standard would, since they restrict the statute’s protection based on time, 
place, and the type of assistance offered.222  The statute states that in order for a person to be 
shielded from liability for any civil damages resulting from that person’s omissions or acts, the 
person must render “emergency care or assistance without compensation,” “in good faith,” at the 
scene of the emergency, while the victim is being transferred from the scene of the emergency, 
or while the victim is at or being transported to an emergency shelter.223  These requirements all 
have a reasonableness flavor, confining a rescuer’s liability protection to the time and place 
when care is most urgently needed, directly following an accident of some sort and at the scene 
of the crisis.  Other states also employ similar restrictions and a reckless conduct standard.224  
Most other states employ comparable restrictions and a gross negligence conduct standard.225  
Certain other states, such as Texas and Nebraska, appear to apply even more forgiving conduct 
standards in their Good Samaritan statutes, when examined from the rescuer’s point of view.226  
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These statutes further demonstrate the prevalence of the public policy protecting potential 
rescuers throughout the country, and support the idea of a bifurcated standard. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 At one end of the standard spectrum, Barlow essentially retired the maritime rescue 
doctrine by adopting a reasonable seaman standard.  At the other end of the standard spectrum, 
Furka II applied a reckless and wanton standard to all aspects of the maritime rescue doctrine; 
thereby allowing rescuer plaintiffs the chance to recover for injuries sustained during the course 
of what no reasonable seaman would consider an emergency.  Neither extreme approach offers 
the best solution – a compromise.  The maritime rescue doctrine should use a bifurcated 
standard: applying a reasonableness standard to the rescuer’s perception of the situation and a 
recklessness standard to the rescuer’s conduct.  A bifurcated standard ought to apply to the 
maritime rescue doctrine because: it is thematically consistent with the purposes of the Jones 
Act; the employees at issue have no independent duty to rescue; and, such a standard 
simultaneously comports with the rescue doctrine’s underlying public policy purpose, and the 
doctrine’s strong ties to proximate causation and the reasonably foreseeable.  Following any 
other standard would simply add insult to a rescuer plaintiff’s previously sustained injuries. 
